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URBAN TERRORISTS: ADDRESSING CHICAGO'S
LOSING BATTLE WITH GANG VIOLENCE
INTRODUCTION
When the gangsters were clashing, [John] Stege [Chicago Chief of
Detectives in 1927] always knew that he could summon the press to
his office, wave around a seized machine gun or shotgun, and get his
picture in the next day's papers, thus reminding the good citizens of
Chicago that he was on the job. That he seldom made an arrest
mattered little.'
Almost a century later, these symbolic gestures are still being used
by the city, as evidenced by the Gang Congregation Ordinance of
1992 (Original Ordinance) and the Gang Congregation Ordinance of
2000 (Revised Ordinance). 2 Chicago has long been an epicenter for
gang violence; since the days of Al Capone, up to the modern-day
Latin Kings, the streets of Chicago have been plagued with violence.
And just as long as gangs have existed, so too has the tradition of
police using empty gestures to appease public concern instead of ef-
fective strategies to combat gang activity and violence. As Professor
John Hagedorn of the University of Illinois at Chicago noted, "We've
been at war for 40 years with gangs and maybe it's time to think about
a different strategy; it's not working all that well." 3 Although it may
be hard to sell the citizens of Chicago on new gang-suppression strate-
gies, the data indicates that prior strategies have been unsuccessful.
The events that took place in 2010 and 2011 prove that gang vio-
lence is still a predominant threat to Chicagoans' safety and that not
much has changed with respect to successful gang prevention and in-
tervention since the city's origins. In June 2010, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided McDonald v. City of Chicago, holding that the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms is fully applicable to the
states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 At around the same
time, a series of gang-related handgun murders shook up the local
1. JONATHAN EIG, GET CAPONE 83 (2010).
2. See Ana Petrovic, Chicago's Gang Loitering Ordinance, GANGRESEARCH.NET, http://www.
gangresearch.net/GangResearchPolicy/law.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
3. Steve Edwards & Richard Steele, Cops and Neighbors: Explaining the Divide Between Po-
lice and the Community, WBEZ (June 12, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.wbez.org/episode-seg-
ments/2011-05-30/cops-and-neighbors-explaining-divide-between-police-and-community-87166.
4. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). McDonald made it legal for
private citizens to own and keep guns in their homes.
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community.5 That summer, Chicago saw the worst two-month run of
fatal gun violence against the city's police in forty years.6 Gang repre-
sentatives, in an unprecedented move, held a press conference and
met with police officials regarding gang-related street violence.7 In
late 2010, then-Mayor Richard M. Daley pushed to deploy more po-
lice to combat street violence by 2011.8 In 2011, flash mobs9 terror-
ized tourists and beachgoers, causing newly elected Mayor Rahm
Emanuel and newly minted Police Superintendent Garry McCarthy to
restrategize their gang-suppression approaches. 10 Groups of young
gang members assaulted and robbed people in the city; in one in-
stance, fifteen to twenty men between the ages of sixteen and twenty
approached a man, threw a baseball at him, and assaulted him."
These events of 2010 and 2011 highlight Chicago's enduring struggle
to end gang violence. 12
In light of recent events, it seems that the dilemma of how to end
street-gang violence, which has always been simmering on Chicago
5. See Mark Guarino, Why Gang Violence Plagues Chicago, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept.
6, 2010, at 18. While murder rates for 2010 are not Chicago's historical worst, several police
murders and gang shooting deaths have "alarmed" Chicagoans and brought attention back to
the city's "chronic gang problem." Id. As of August 12, 2010, the homicide count in Chicago
was 273, more than half of 2009's total of 458. Id. This number far outpaced murder rates in
other big American cities, such as Los Angeles, which reported 313 murders in 2009. Id.
6. Mark J. Konkol & Frank Main, 'No-Snitch' Code Keeps Shooters on Streets as Police Fight
Uphill Battle for Public Trust, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, July 27, 2010, at 16.
7. See Mark Guarino, Gangs vs. Chicago Police: An Open Feud over Blame for Street Vio-
lence, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 2, 2010, at 8 (describing the press conference during
which gang members told the police that they were not the only contributors to Chicago's street
violence and that police were also a cause).
8. See Press Release, Mayor's Press Office, Mayor Daley Says Assigning More Police to Street
Duty Will Be First Priority in His 2011 Budget Proposal (Oct. 12, 2010), available at http://www.
cityofchicago.org/content/city/en/depts/mayor/pressroom/pressreleases/2010/october_2010/
1012_police-staffing.html.
9. Wikipedia defines a flash mob as a "group of people who assemble suddenly in a public
place, perform an unusual and sometimes seemingly pointless act for a brief time, then disperse,
often for the purposes of entertainment, satire, artistic expression or-in rare cases-violence.
Flash mobs are organized via telecommunications, social media, or viral emails." Flash Mob,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flashmob (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
10. Ryan Haggerty & Kristen Mack, Emanuel Praises Police Response, CHI. TRIB., June 8,
2011, at 6.
11. Emanuel's First Test: Gang Mob Attacks Continue in Chicago After Memorial Beach Clos-
ing, BIG Gov'T (June 7, 2011, 6:21 AM), http://biggovernment.com/rebelpundit/2011/06/07/
emanuels-first-test-gang-mob-attacks-continue-in-chicago-after-memorial-beach-closing.
12. News outlets and reporters may have readers believing that flash mobs are a new phenom-
enon, but news reports dating back to the nineteenth century indicate that flash mobs were, and
have always been, present and active in Chicago. See generally Whet Moser, A Brief History of
Flash Mobs and Chicago Beach Violence, CHICAGOMAG.COM (June 8, 2011, 10:28 AM), http://
www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/The-312/June-2011/Flash-Mobs-and-Chicago-Beach-
Violence.
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law enforcement's back burner, has again begun to boil over. The
need for effective and nondiscriminatory gang-violence prevention
strategies is as urgent now as it has ever been. Now is an ideal time
for Chicago to abandon its "heavy-handed" gang-suppression tactics1 3
in favor of community-driven gang-intervention programs that have
proven successful in New York City,14 which has lower gang-violence
statistics than Chicago.15 As Harold Pollack, co-director of the Chi-
cago Crime Lab at the University of Chicago, stated, "There's no
question that both the patrolling strength and the strategies in police
departments make a difference in reducing crime,"16 but "[w]e're
missing a big policy opportunity to help, not only with increasing the
size of the police, but with doing other violence-intervention efforts
like youth employment."' 7
Chicago's current approach to gang violence can be put into context
by the Original Ordinance, which attempted to prevent gang-related
crime by making it illegal for people to loiter.' 8 In City of Chicago v.
Morales, a landmark case decided in 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the Original Ordinance was unconstitutional because it vio-
lated due process, in that it was impermissibly vague on its face, and
constituted an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.' 9 After
Morales, Chicago enacted the Revised Ordinance, which amended the
Original Ordinance by making the language more specific and less ar-
bitrary in application. 20 However, the Revised Ordinance has not ac-
complished its desired effect of lowering gang violence. The Revised
Ordinance is rarely used in Chicago's current efforts to reduce gang
crime and is a clear example of Chicago's misguided and symbolic,
rather than practical, suppression strategies.
Furthermore, it is up for debate whether the Revised Ordinance has
in fact remedied the vagueness problem that plagued the first ver-
sion. 21 In many respects, the Revised Ordinance is still as vague and
13. Thomas A. Myers, Note, The Unconstitutionality, Ineffectiveness, and Alternatives of Gang
Injunctions, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 300 (2009).
14. New York's gangs are different than those of Los Angeles and Chicago because its gangs
"have not been institutionalized and are of more recent origins." Email from John Hagedorn,
Professor, Univ. of Ill., to author (Aug. 1, 2011, 12:25 CST) (on file with author). Although New
York is a different city with unique problems, its approaches can be used as a loose model for
Chicago's efforts to deter gang involvement and crime.
15. See Myers, supra note 13, at 300.
16. Guarino, supra note 5, at 18.
17. Id.
18. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1999) (plurality opinion).
19. Id. at 41.
20. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
21. See Petrovic, supra note 2.
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arbitrary as its predecessor, and it still allows for discriminatory appli-
cation. Chicago must refocus its gang-suppression tactics and should
use educational and social reform programs similar to those that have
proven successful in New York City as its new weapons against gang
prevalence.
Part II of this Comment examines the history of Chicago's Gang
Congregation Ordinance and the current gang-loitering enforcement
climate in Chicago. 22 It also examines New York City's gang-violence
intervention techniques and contrasts its success to Chicago. Part III
analyzes Chicago's current gang-violence suppression tactics, as illus-
trated by the Revised Ordinance arrest statistics. 23 It concludes that
the current tactics are ineffective and discriminatory, and provides an
alternative method of gang prevention for Chicago to utilize.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part explores the origins and recent developments of gang
crime in Chicago, as well as New York City, in order to determine the
techniques that have been successful in deterring gang crime. It
presents the Original Ordinance as an illustration of one of the many
faulty gang-violence suppression tactics. It also discusses Morales and
the Revised Ordinance to determine if current Chicago techniques
have improved over time.
A. Brief History of Chicago's Strategy Pre-Morales
1. Chicago's Strategies Prior to 1992
Gangs have run the streets of Chicago since the mid-twentieth cen-
tury 24 Due to racial segregation and discrimination-which has made
Chicago one of the most racially segregated cities in the nation-
gangs proliferated in certain ethnic neighborhoods. 25 In the 1960s,
community organizations teamed up with gang leaders to create grass-
roots organizations aimed at providing gang youth with education and
recreational programs.26 Mayor Daley feared that gang-member in-
volvement in community organizations "would upset his political ma-
22. See infra notes 24-117 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 118-73 and accompanying text.
24. See Organized Youth Crime in Chicago, GANGRESEARCH.NET, http://gangresearch.net/
ChicagoGangs/blackstonerangers/Daley.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
25. See id.; see also JUDITH GREENE & KEVIN PRANIS, JUSTICE POL'Y INST., GANG WARS:
THE FAILURE OF ENFORCEMENT TACTICS AND THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SAFETY
STRATEGIES 21 (2007), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/07-07_REPGang
WarsGC-PS-AC-JJ.pdf.
26. Organized Youth Crime in Chicago, supra note 24.
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chine" and called for more police intervention and arrests instead.2 7
By the early 1970s, half of Illinois's prisoners were affiliated with
gangs.2 8 The gang ties these prisoners formed in prison remained as
they were released, and they have since reshaped Chicago's gang cul-
ture.29 When gang members sought more community-action pro-
grams to escape poverty, Daley responded by adopting policies
further segregating them, effectively restricting them to housing
projects3 0 and denying impoverished youth, gang members, and ex-
convicts access to education.3'
2. The Gang Congregation Ordinance of 1992
In 1992, in the face of rising gang crime, Chicago's City Council on
Police and Fire held a series of hearings at which citizens were able to
testify regarding problems they faced as a result of street-gang pres-
ence. 3 2  Residents claimed that "gang members loiter as part of a
strategy to claim territory, recruit new members, and intimidate rival
gangs and ordinary community residents."33 The Council concluded
that street-gang presence was "largely responsible" for the high num-
bers of gang murders, drug crime, and intimidation in communities. 34
In June 1992, Chicago enacted its first Gang Congregation Ordi-
nance,35 which prohibited gang members from loitering in public
places.36 The Original Ordinance provided that a police officer could
27. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 25, at 21.
28. Id. at 22.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 23 ("Federal funds for construction of public housing had become available
during the 1960s, but Mayor Daley's deep commitment to racial containment did not allow for
dispersal of housing sites outside of Chicago ghettos. The Robert Taylor Homes epitomized the
Daley-era approach, with 28 towering blocks of high-rise projects warehousing 27,000 Chi-
cagoans, virtually cutting them off from access to better schools and work opportunities in white
neighborhoods." (citation omitted)); see also JOHN M. HAGEDORN & BRIGID RAUCH, VARIA-
TIONS IN URBAN HOMICIDE: CHICAGo, NEW YORK CITY, AND GLOBAL URBAN POLICY 11
(2004), available at http://www.uic.edu/cuppa/cityfutures/papers/webpapers/cityfuturespapers/
session3_2/3_2variations.pdf.
31. See GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 25, at 23.
32. City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 57 (Ill. 1997).
33. Keasa Hollister, Individual Autonomy Versus Community: Is It All or Nothing? An Anal-
ysis of City of Chicago v. Morales, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 221, 227 (2000) (quoting Morales, 687
N.E.2d at 57-58) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. (quoting Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 58).
35. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 45 (1999) (plurality opinion).
36. Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 58; see also JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CITY COUNCIL
OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIs 18,293-94 (June 17, 1992) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF PRO-
CEEDINGS, June 17, 1992] (describing the Original Ordinance's passage); CHI., ILL., CODE § 8-4-
015 (1992); Gailann Jarocki, New Law Against Violence Goes into Effect in 2010, EXAM-
INER.COM (Dec. 2, 2009), http://examiner.com/residential-in-chicago/new-law-against-violence-
goes-into-effect-2010 (same).
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order "a person whom he reasonably believe[d] to be a criminal street
gang member" to disperse from an area, and further arrest that person
if he did not comply with the order.37 The Original Ordinance defined
"loiter" as "remain[ing] in any one place with no apparent purpose."38
In August 1992, the Chicago Police Department passed General Or-
der 92-4, which provided officers with guidelines for enforcing the new
law.39 The Order directed officers to target only people they had
probable cause to believe were members of a gang in a specific dis-
trict.4 0 This was an attempt to curb overly broad police discretion and
discrimination. 41 Even with the guidelines limiting the Ordinance's
application, the police issued over 89,000 dispersal orders and arrested
more than 42,000 people for violating the Original Ordinance in the
three years following its enactment. 42
Despite its vigorous enforcement, Cook County trial courts dis-
agreed as to the validity of the Original Ordinance.43 In City of Chi-
cago v. Youkhana, police arrested James Youkhana, along with
thirteen other defendants, for violating the Original Ordinance. 44
Youkhana challenged the Original Ordinance by claiming that it was
unconstitutionally vague. The circuit court and appellate court
agreed, 45 which provided the basis for those previously convicted
under the Original Ordinance to challenge, and ultimately overturn,
their convictions.46
B. City of Chicago v. Morales
One such individual who was able to overturn his conviction was
Jesus Morales. Morales and five other defendants were convicted of
violating the Original Ordinance at a bench trial prior to the court's
37. JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS, June 17, 1992, supra note 36, at 18,294; see also CHI., ILL.,
CODE § 8-4-015.
38. JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS, June 17, 1992, supra note 36, at 18,294; see also CHI., ILL.,
CODE § 8-4-015.
39. Morales, 527 U.S. at 48; see also General Order No. 92-4 (Aug. 7, 1992), reprinted in Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari at app. G, Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (No. 97-1121).
40. General Order No. 92-4. "General Order 92-4 construes the ordinance to require proba-
ble cause to believe that a member of a criminal street gang is loitering, and there are rigorous
standards for determining membership in a criminal street gang." Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari, supra note 39, at 12 n.7.
41. General Order No. 92-4.
42. Morales, 527 U.S. at 49.
43. City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 59 (Ill. 1997).
44. City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
45. Id.
46. See Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 57; see also Hollister, supra note 33, at 229 ("Based on the
Youkhana decision, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed Morales's conviction and Chicago ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois.").
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decision in Youkhana and were sentenced to jail.4 7 Morales appealed
the decision, and the appellate court reversed the convictions based
on its holding in Youkhana.48 The City of Chicago appealed the re-
versal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which agreed with the appel-
late court and held the Original Ordinance to be impermissibly
vague.49 The City then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Court held that the Original Ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague.50 More specifically, the plurality concluded that the definition
of loitering-"to remain in any one place with no apparent pur-
pose"-was too vague to give an ordinary person notice as to what
constitutes criminal conduct.5 1 The terms of the dispersal order were
so unclear that a loiterer could not possibly understand how to com-
ply: how far and for how long must he disperse? 52
The Court also reasoned that the Original Ordinance was unconsti-
tutional because it violated "the requirement that a legislature estab-
lish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement."5 3 The Court
rejected the City's argument that the text of the statute imposed limi-
tations on law enforcement that were sufficient to prevent vast police
discretion.54 The "no apparent purpose" language provided police
with the authority to subjectively decide someone's apparent purpose
and issue a dispersal order.5 The Original Ordinance did not require
one's loitering to be harmful, and it applied to gang members and
non-gang members alike.56 The Court also concluded that General
Order 92-4 did not provide sufficient enforcement guidelines to pass
constitutional muster.57
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor outlined legislative
guidelines that essentially provided the City of Chicago with a
roadmap to reconstruct the Original Ordinance in such a fashion that
could be constitutional.58 Justice O'Connor suggested that "reasona-
ble alternatives to combat the very real threat posed by gang intimida-
47. Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 57.
48. Id.
49. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d at 36.
50. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 51 (1999) (plurality opinion).
51. Id. at 56-57, 60 (quoting Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 61).
52. Id. at 59.
53. Id. at 60 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
54. Id. at 61-62.
55. Id. at 62.
56. Morales, 527 U.S. at 62-63.
57. Id. at 63.
58. See Robert Delchin, The Gang's All Here: Anti-Loitering Laws in the Face of City of Chi-
cago v. Morales, 48 CLEV. Sr. L. REV. 215, 222 (2000).
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tion and violence" may exist and implied that the City could have
constructed the Original Ordinance more narrowly by precisely defin-
ing terms such as gang member, gang activity, and loiter.59 Justice
O'Connor highlighted the City's other laws that had similar goals to
the Original Ordinance60 and declared that the Original Ordinance
should explicitly apply only to loiterers who are known gang members
loitering with a harmful purpose.61
C. Chicago Post-Morales and the Chicago Gang Congregation
Ordinance of 2000
Justice O'Connor's opinion did not go unnoticed. In February 2000,
Chicago revised the Gang Congregation Ordinance in precisely the
manner she prescribed. 62 The revision allows police to disperse any-
one engaged in gang loitering in a public place. 63 The Revised Ordi-
nance also defines gang loitering-a definition not present in the
original version.64 In addition, the Revised Ordinance specifies the
appropriate timeframe and action for a person to comply with a dis-
persal order.65 "Tracy L. Meares, a University of Chicago law profes-
sor who helped draft the new ordinance, sa[id] it actually restrains
police discretion . . . . The key . . . is that the ordinance criminalizes
loitering with intent to commit a crime, rather than merely loitering
without an identifiable purpose." 66 This amendment seems to satisfy
59. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 67-68 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60. Id.; see also id. at 52 n.17 (plurality opinion) ("In fact the city already [had] several laws
that serve[d] this purpose. Deputy Superintendent Cooper, the only representative of the police
department at the Committee on Police and Fire hearing on the ordinance, testified that, of the
kinds of behavior people had discussed at the hearing, 90 percent of those instances [were] actu-
ally criminal offenses where people, in fact, can be arrested." (citations omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). But see Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v.
Morales: The Intersection of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal
Law, 39 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 101, 111-12 ("Justice Stevens, in rejecting the anti-gang ordinance in
Morales, suggested Chicago already had plenty of prosecutorial tools at its disposal-without
acknowledging that the state drug conspiracy statute post-dated the Morales ordinance and that
the mob action statute was partially unenforceable due to the federal injunction.").
61. Morales, 527 U.S. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
62. See JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO,
ILLINOIs 25,708-09 (Feb. 16, 2000) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINoS, Feb. 16, 2000]; see
also CHI., ILL., CODE § 8-4-015 (2000); JoSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMI-
NAL LAw 119 (5th ed. 2009) (indicating that Justice O'Connor created a roadmap for a constitu-
tionally acceptable revision).
63. See DRESSLER, supra note 62, at 119.
64. See JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGs, Feb. 16, 2000, supra note 62, at 25,709; see also CHI.,
ILL., CODE § 8-4-015.
65. See JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS, Feb. 16, 2000, supra note 62, at 25,710; see also CHI.,
ILL., CODE § 8-4-015.
66. Margaret Graham Tebo, Second City Tries Again: Chicago Hopes New Loitering Law
Avoids Constitutional Defects, A.B.A. J., June 2000, at 28, 28.
[Vol. 61:11851192
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Justice O'Connor's recommendations because it limits the discretion
of police conduct and defines the conduct that is illegal or serves a
harmful purpose.67 After the revision, the Chicago Police Department
promulgated General Order 00-02, which again provided police with
enforcement guidelines and limited the scope of possible
enforcement.68
A look at post-Morales gang-crime rates informs the analysis of the
Revised Ordinance's effectiveness. Between 1991 and 2004, there
were 3,422 gang-motivated murders in Chicago. 69 The percentage of
gang-related murder increased approximately 10%-from about 25%
to around 35%-since 2000, the year after the Morales decision.70
This increase in Chicago gang activity was happening at a time when
overall murder rates in Chicago and across the nation were on the
decline.7 '
Between January and August 2010, there were 313 murders, up
from 308 murders in the same period for 2009.72 Out of the 313
murders, 105 had undetermined motives, while 93 were gang related.73
Thus, approximately 45% of all murders with determined motives
were gang related.74 Of all murders within this time period, 61.2% of
the murders involved gangs, meaning that either the victim or of-
fender was associated with a gang or that the incident was gang
related.75
The high level of gang-related violence did not go unnoticed by the
community. After crackdowns and criticism by city officials, the gang
community responded to the public anger directed toward it. "You
say it's gangs, drugs and guns. We say we need jobs, opportunities and
contracts . . . . That's the resolution," proclaimed a self-identified for-
mer gang member after former Police Superintendent Jody Weis's
gang summit in August 2010.76 Parole officers instructed gang mem-
67. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64-65 (1999) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. Petrovic, supra note 2.
69. Tim LAVERY, RESEARCH & DEV. Div., CHI. POLICE DEP'T, GANG-MOTIVATED MURDERS
1991-2004, at 1 (2005), available at https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/
News/Statistical%20Reports/Crime%20Trend%20Reports/GangMotivatedMurders.pdf.
70. See id. at 1 & fig.1.
71. See id.
72. RESEARCH & DEV. Div., CI. POLICE DEP'T, CRIME SUMMARY: JANUARY-AUGUST 2010
(2010), available at https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/News/Statistical
%20Reports/Index%20Crime%2OStatistics/2010%20Index%20Crime%2OStatistics/mcsAug10.
pdf.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Mike Puccinelli, Chicago Gang Members Blast City, Police Policies, CBSNEwS (Sept. 2,
2010, 1:00 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/09/02/nationallmain6829136.shtml.
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bers to attend a meeting with Weis, but these gang members were
instead met by not only Weis, but also prosecutors with threats of in-
creased sanctions for their criminal gang activities.77 In response, pre-
sent and former gang leaders assembled and protested, arguing that
the police were simply continuing the harassing, Jon Burge-style gang
combat techniques.78 The gang crisis in Chicago is notably ongoing
and unresolved.
D. Alternative Policing Strategies
While Chicago was spending funds on police enforcement, New
York directed its funds to refurbishing its impoverished crime-prone
neighborhoods. 79 This, among the other distinctions illustrated below,
highlights the critical differences between the history of Chicago's and
New York City's gang problems, as well as their respective suppres-
sion and prevention tactics. The general distinction can be summed
up as Chicago pouring money into heavy-handed police suppression
and New York City investing in improving the neighborhoods most in
need of aid.8 0
1. Chicago's Gang-Policing Strategy
a. The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy
Aside from anti-loitering ordinances, Chicago created the Chicago
Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) in 1993, bringing police and the
community together to fight street-gang crime.8' Initially, only five of
Chicago's police districts were included in the program. 2 These "pro-
totype districts" were "diverse in terms of their demographics, eco-
nomics, crime problems, and levels of community organization," so
they provided a testing ground for the CAPS program.83 As of 2011,
CAPS is operational in all of Chicago's neighborhoods and has been
recognized as one of the most ambitious community policing initia-
77. Puccinelli, supra note 76; Chicago Police Chief Criticized for 'Gang Summit,'
FoxNEWS.COM (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/09/02/chicago-police-chief-criti-
cized-gang-summit.
78. Puccinelli, supra note 76 ("[Former Chicago Police Commander Jon] Burge was convicted
[in June, 2010] of lying about torturing criminal suspects into confessions into the 1970s and
80s.").
79. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 25, at 23.
80. For an interesting article comparing New York City's and Chicago's gang histories, see
John Hagedorn, The Gangs of. . . , CHI. TRIB., Jan. 19, 2003, § 2, at 3.
81. What Is CAPS?, CHI. POLICE DEP'T, https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portall
ClearPath/Get%20Involved/How%20CAPS%20works/What%20is%20CAPS (last visited Nov.
12, 2011).
82. Id.
83. Id.
1194 [Vol. 61:1185
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tives in the United States.84 CAPS is administered via beat meetings
that are held in all 285 Chicago police beats at least once a quarter.
The meetings allow residents of the neighborhoods and police "to dis-
cuss chronic problems on the beat and to engage in problem solving
using the CAPS five-step problem solving process."85 The creation of
CAPS and the dialog it fostered between the community and police, at
a time when the groups were becoming more isolated, seemed to ini-
tially work in curbing crime at a neighborhood level. 86
The Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium reviewed
the effectiveness of CAPS in 2004 after its initial success.87 The evalu-
ation was based on data gathered by over sixty-five members of the
Consortium from thousands of residents and police officers through-
out Chicago.88 The Consortium graded the various parts of the pro-
84. See id.
85. What Are Beat Meetings ... And Why Are They Important?, CHI. POLICE DEP'T, https://
portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPathlGet%20Involved/How% 2 0CAPS%
2 0
works/Beat%20Meetings (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). The police department's five steps to
building a safer community include the following:
1. Identify and Prioritize-Through a democratic process of brainstorming and vot-
ing, select the most important issue for you and your neighbors from a list of issues that
your block club is willing to work on. Some things to consider when you are prioritiz-
ing are, how many people does the issue affect, and if it is something that you will be
able to impact in a reasonable amount of time.
2. Analyze-Using a "Crime Triangle" of location, victims and offenders will help
focus your efforts. Ask "the who", "the what", "the where", "the when", "the why"
and "the how" questions about all three sides of the triangle. A thorough analysis will
help you develop more effective solutions.
3. Design strategies-Again, through a process of brainstorming and group discus-
sion, plan what you are going to do about the issue and who is going to do it. Remem-
ber, everyone should have a role to play. Make sure that the strategies you chose are
legal, feasible and won't take too long.
4. Implement strategies-This is the time when you put your strategies in action.
Particularly with respect to crime-related issues, the community, police and other City
departments need to help each other to follow through and complete the tasks.
5. Evaluate and celebrate-This is the time to review with everyone how the strate-
gies worked, what challenges may have been encountered, what strategies might need
to be changed, and whether the issue has been completely addressed. Once you have
evaluated the results you have achieved, always remember to celebrate your successes.
Problem Solving, CHI. POLICE DEP'T, https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/Clear
Path/Get%20Involved/Problem%20Solving (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (emphases omitted). See
generally WESLEY G. SKOGAN & LYNN STEINER, CHI. CMrY. POLICING EVALUATION CONSOR-
Tium, CAPS AT TEN: COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGo 153 (2004), available at https://por-
tal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/portal/ClearPathlNews/Statistical%20Reports/Other% 2 0
Reports/Caps10.pdf.
86. SKOGAN & STEINER, supra note 85, at 153.
87. See generally id.
88. See id. at 153. Since CAPS began in 1993, the Consortium "surveyed about 48,500 re-
sidents, about two-thirds of them at home and one-third at beat meetings. Several thousand of
these respondents were CAPS activists . . . , and another 5,000 were problem-solving training
participants. [The Consortium] also surveyed about 13,600 police officers." Id.
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gram, noting how difficult it is to coordinate an effective
neighborhood-policing program in a large city like Chicago.89 CAPS
received As for both the agency partnerships and reorganization cate-
gories; a B for public involvement; and a C for problem solving. 90 The
Consortium found "that efforts to solve local priority problems ha[d]
not been very effective" and that "[o]ver time the effectiveness of beat
meetings in setting problem-solving agendas for the public ha[d] de-
clined. Officers have had no refresher training in problem-solving,
and most of a decade has passed since resident activists were offered
any training opportunities." 91
b. Project Safe Neighborhoods
Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), enacted by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice in 2002,92 allows the Chicago Police Department, U.S.
Attorney's Office, Cook County State's Attorney's Office, and com-
munity organizations to collaborate in targeting the city's most egre-
gious criminal offenders and transferring their cases when punishment
would be harsher under federal law.9 3 For instance, every case involv-
ing a state defendant charged with a gun crime can be reviewed for
federal prosecution to impose the maximum penalty.94 "The aim of
these prosecutions is to severely punish those who pose a significant
danger to their communities and deter others from committing gun
crime." 95 The program also contains an "Anti-Gang Initiative." 96 Be-
cause gang members in Chicago are often involved in gun violence,
"Gang-Strategy teams" investigate gang activity in Chicago and focus
on identifying high-ranking gang members that deserve higher en-
forcement scrutiny. The Anti-Gang Initiative's strategy is twofold:
First, to prioritize prevention programs to provide at-risk youth and
ex-offenders returning to the community with opportunities that
help them resist gang involvement; and second, to ensure robust en-
forcement when gang related violence does occur.97
89. Id. at 154.
90. Id. at 154-55.
91. Id. at 155.
92. TRACEY MEARES ET AL., HOMICIDE AND GUN VIOLENCE IN CHICAGo: EVALUATION AND
SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS PROGRAM 1 (2009), available at http://www.
psnchicago.org/PDFs/2009-PSN-Research-Brief-v2.pdf.
93. Criminal Justice Initiatives, PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS, http://www.psnchicago.org/
Criminal-Justice-Initiatives.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
94. Project Safe Neighborhoods Chicago, PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS, http://www.psn
chicago.org[PSN-Chicago.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
95. Criminal Justice Initiatives, supra note 93.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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In 2009, a committee conducted an evaluation of PSN in Chicago. 98
The study indicated that homicide levels reduced at a greater rate in
areas where PSN was active than in control neighborhoods.99 How-
ever, "more federal prosecutions and getting more guns off of the
street [were] associated with a small portion of the observed drop in
homicides in the PSN neighborhoods."100
In addition to CAPS and PSN, Chicago employed other
neighborhood-oriented programs such as Gang Violence Reduction
Program (GVRP)ol and Neighbors Against Violence. 102 According
to one evaluation, GVRP seemed to slow violent gang-related crime
in the area, with gang-related deaths decreasing. 103 However, conflict-
ing evaluations exist with regard to GVRP's actual effect on curbing
gang violence.104
2. New York City's Gang-Policing Strategy
In contrast with Chicago, New York City's gang violence problem
"represent[s] just a tiny blip on the New York crime screen."10 5 New
York's recorded gang problems began as early as the 1940s, and the
city's first combative step toward reducing gang activity was the crea-
98. See generally MEARES ET AL., supra note 92.
99. Id. at 1 fig.1.
100. Id. at 4.
101. See Strategy: Gang Prevention Through Community Intervention with High-Risk Youth,
NAT'L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, http://www.ncpc.org/topics/violent-crime-and-personal-
safety/strategies/strategy-gang-prevention-through-community-intervention-with-high-risk-
youth (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Gang Prevention].
Focused on two gangs in the city's Little Village section, the project serves a community
that experienced fifty-three gang-related crimes involving handgun use in the year
before the program's inception. The program's primary goal is to reduce gang assaults
and homicides on six police beats. It focuses on two hundred youth aged seventeen to
twenty-five. The project team meets weekly to share information about gang activity,
discuss interventions in gang conflicts, and plan enforcement strategies. Street workers
concentrate on building relationships with current and former gang members, often as
negotiators of truces among gangs or factions.
Id. But see Irving A. Spergel, Gang Violence Reduction Program, NAT'L GANG CENTER, http://
www.nationalgangcenter.gov/SPT/Programs/71 (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) (stating that, in real-
ity, the effects and results of this program are mixed and that it is unclear how helpful the
program is).
102. Gang Prevention, supra note 101. "The Neighborhood Against Violence (NAV) group
keeps police and prosecutors aware of residents' concerns about gang activity and violence.
NAV has recruited block watch groups, church congregations, agencies that serve youth, and
parents as members. Probation administrators focus on collaboration with youth-serving agen-
cies and on jobs-development programs." Id.
103. Id.
104. See generally Spergel, supra note 101.
105. GREENE & PRANIs, supra note 25, at 14.
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tion of the New York City "Youth Board" in 1947.106 This organiza-
tion supported social gang-intervention strategies and deployed
"street-level gang workers" in areas with high crime activity to estab-
lish relationships with the younger gang leaders. 107 In the following
decade the number of workers more than tripled and gangs' suspicion
of the group began to dissipate.108 The organization focused on pro-
viding recreational programs, community-organized events, job op-
portunities, and mediation sessions for young gang members.109 The
city's dedication to its social-driven anti-gang technique "fostered a
far more constructive, less counterproductive response to gang vio-
lence than the harsh law enforcement tactics employed by police to
suppress gangs in other cities." 10
The Youth Board worked with police to inform them about gang
uprisings and wars and to encourage better patrol tactics."' Despite
the cooperation and positive results, police agencies continued to push
for more police crackdowns and less social intervention, but were
reined in because of the program's effectiveness.112 In the decades
that followed, additional social programs-such as the Lower Eastside
Neighborhood Association and Mobilization for Youth-were put in
place to assist in job searches and training for gang members, and
these programs largely abated the gang problem in New York. 13
In the 1980s a resurgence of sporadic and scattered street violence
occurred, but the city did not attribute it to gang crime.114 A research
study conducted by New York's leading urban anthropologist, Mercer
Sullivan, determined that the violence was spurred by media coverage
of gangs across the country and in New York."15 In the late 1990s,
gang affiliations crept into New York, and people who had previously
not been associated with modern notions of gangs began to so affiliate
themselves." 6
106. The New York City Youth Board, BULL. NAT'L Ass'N SECONDARY-SCHOOL PRINCIPALS,
Nov. 1957, at 28, 29, 188.
107. See id.; see also GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 25, at 15.
108. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 25, at 15.
109. Id.
110. OJJDP Summary, YOUTH GANG PROGRAMS & STRATEGIES, https://www.ncjrs.gov/html
ojjdp/summary_2000_8/intervention.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
111. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 25, at 15-16.
112. Id. at 16.
113. Id. at 16-17; see also JAMES C. HOWELL & G. DAVID CURRY, MOBILIZING COMMUNITIES
To ADDRESS GANG PROBLEMS 4-5 (2009), available at http://gangs.umd.edu/Downloads/Preven-
tion/OJJDP Mobilizing-CommunitiesjtoAddress_- GangOProblemsHandout.doc.
114. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 25, at 18.
115. See Mercer L. Sullivan, Maybe We Shouldn't Study "Gangs": Does Reification Obscure
Youth Violence?, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 170, 186 (2005).
116. GREENE & PRANIS, supra note 25, at 19.
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An examination of Chicago and New York City indicates that gang
crime has a long and pervasive history in both. It further demon-
strates that several methods for attacking the gang-crime problem ex-
ist and that some strategies are more successful and enduring than
others.117
III. ANALYSIS
Chicago's Revised Ordinance is just as problematic as its predeces-
sor, and it is yet another failed attempt by Chicago police and govern-
ment to sell the public on current gang-suppression techniques. In
view of the high levels of gang activity and violence that have plagued
Chicago since before Morales, both gang-loitering ordinances and po-
lice-involved community programs such as CAPS and GVRP have
failed in their efforts to stop gang activity in gang-prone
neighborhoods.
This Part examines the data regarding dispersal orders since the
Morales decision. This data indicates that the use of the Revised Or-
dinance has decreased sharply and suggests racial and geographical
discrimination in the issuance of dispersal orders. This Part also ex-
amines the Revised Ordinance in its current form and discusses as-
pects that are still problematic. It then analyzes the necessity and
effectiveness of the Revised Ordinance and argues that alternative
methods of preventing gang loitering and violence can be imple-
mented with success. Stated simply, the Revised Ordinance is a con-
crete example of police tactics gone wrong.
A. Revised Ordinance Arrest Statistics
The Chicago Police Department compiled the following data break-
ing down dispersal orders issued since the enactment of the Revised
Ordinance in 2000. The information in Figure 1 separates the orders
by district. The information in Figure 2 separates the orders by race.
Figure 3 breaks down the orders by age.
1. Statistics by Police District 2000-October 15, 2010
Chicago is divided into twenty-five districts, each headed by a dis-
trict commander.118 Each district is divided into three sectors, which
117. See John Hagedorn & Brigid Rauch, Housing, Gangs, and Homicide: What We Can
Learn from Chicago, 42 URB. Ave. REV. 435, 444-46 (2007).
118. Know Your District, Know Your Beat, CHI. POLICE DEP'T, https://portal.chicagopolice.
org/portal/page/portal/ClearPath/Get%20Involved/How%20CAPS%20works/KnowYourDis-
trict (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
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are then divided into three to five beats. 119 The purpose of this seg-
mentation is to divide the city in a way that localizes police efforts to
meet the particular needs of the constituents in each district.120 The
majority of dispersal orders are issued in the southern and western
parts of the city. 12 1 The information contained in the chart below con-
firms that only a few districts account for the majority of all dispersal
orders issued.122
FIGURE 1: ORDERS ISSUED BY POLICE DISTRICT123
Jan. 1,
District 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-Oct. Total
15, 2010
1:Central 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3
2: Wentworth 2 0 1 16 1 2 9 1 0 0 0 32
3: Grand Crossing 0 4 2 2 0 9 20 36 25 13 0 111
4: South Chicago 0 26 14 5 13 94 94 47 34 89 43 459
5: Calumet 0 1 4 5 0 10 0 7 0 0 6 33
6: Gresham 1 1 0 1 9 9 1 2 38 25 36 123
7: Englewood 0 0 1 2 7 6 2 4 9 5 1 37
8: Chicago Lawn 0 1 1 0 0 8 15 14 11 46 57 153
9: Deering 0 36 46 36 2 5 20 19 26 24 37 251
10: Ogden 0 2 1 8 99 91 40 76 53 26 40 436
11: Harrison 2 4 1 0 0 2 0 0 23 0 0 32
12: Monroe 0 7 0 3 1 1 1 4 9 18 9 53
13: Wood 4 36 23 15 7 16 4 2 2 0 2 111
14: Shakespeare 0 0 9 7 9 7 21 10 3 10 5 81
15:Austin 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 6 4 19
16: Jefferson Park 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17: Albany Park 0 1 0 6 1 0 2 2 6 4 3 25
18: Near North 1 13 4 2 4 8 29 38 14 9 47 169
19:Belmont 1 3 2 0 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 15
20: Lincoln 0 6 1 0 1 0 1 0 5 16 15 45
21:Prairie 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
22: Morgan Park 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6
23: Town Hall 0 0 17 1 4 3 9 4 6 18 23 85
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. See infra note 123 & fig.1.
122. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
123. JAMEs HICKEY, RESEARCH & DEV. Div., CHI. POLICE DEP'T, ARRESTS FOR 8-4-015 BY
DISTRICT (2010) [hereinafter ARRESTS By DISTRICT] (describing arrests by districts in Chicago
between January 1, 2010 and October 15, 2010).
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24: Rogers Park 3 14 28 96 92 63 69 51 58 97 29 600
25: Grand Central 0 4 0 5 8 16 17 17 8 6 5 86
Total 16 160 155 210 261 357 355 337 334 415 368 2,968
2. Statistics by Race 2000-October 15, 2010
The chart below breaks down orders issued by race. It illustrates
that almost all dispersal orders are issued to Black and Hispanic indi-
viduals. Looking at this information in conjunction with the first chart
suggests that these demographics are either being targeted based on
race or, alternatively, their neighborhoods, which happen to have high
concentrations of black and Hispanic residents. In either case, the
data suggests that minorities are the main targets of dispersal orders
under the Revised Ordinance.
FIGURE 2: ORDERS ISSUED BY RACE 12 4
Jan. 1,
Race 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-Oct. Total
15, 2010
Black 11 70 89 126 127 195 224 200 223 278 272 1,815
Hispanic 5 84 62 79 129 149 116 129 106 132 91 1,082
White 0 5 3 5 4 10 13 7 4 5 5 61
Asian/Pacific 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 1 1 0 0 8Islander
Indian 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Total 16 160 155 210 261 357 355 337 334 415 368 2,968
3. Statistics by Age 2000-October 15, 2010
The following chart divides dispersal orders issued by age range.
The numbers indicate that the vast majority of orders are issued to
people under thirty years of age. This is most likely a result of
younger individuals having more of a presence in the neighborhood as
opposed to older individuals who likely are not socializing or as pre-
sent in the streets. It also seems likely that younger individuals who
are more involved with gang activity are more likely to have street-
level presence. Thus, the younger people are more likely to be cited
in violation of the Revised Ordinance.
124. JAMES HICKEY, RESEARCH & DEv. Div., CHI. POLICE DEP'T, ARRESTS FOR 8-4-015 BY
RACE AND AGE (2010) [hereinafter ARRESTS BY RACE AND AGE] (describing arrests by race
and age in Chicago between January 1, 2010 and October 15, 2010).
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FIGURE 3: ORDERS ISSUED BY AGE125
Jan. 1,
Age 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-Oct. Total
15, 2010
<= 20 12 98 86 122 145 218 187 176 248 257 193 1,742
21-30 4 56 57 78 98 120 146 133 77 143 143 1,055
31-40 0 5 10 8 18 14 20 20 7 12 24 138
41+ 0 1 2 2 0 5 2 8 2 3 8 33
Total 16 160 155 210 261 357 355 337 334 415 368 2,968
B. Problems with the Revised Ordinance
While the plurality in Morales found the Original Ordinance void
because it was vague and allowed broad police discretion in making
arrests, it also failed to provide adequate enforcement guidelines.126
In fact, Morales's counsel, the American Civil Liberties Union, noted
that the primary reason Morales and the other defendants were ar-
rested was that the officer had observed "Hispanic teens hanging out
on a corner in a predominantly white neighborhood. The city never
proved Morales was a gang member."127 It seems that the Ordinance,
in its original form, allowed for unconstitutional racial discrimination
in its application. Then, when the City of Chicago revised the Ordi-
nance in 2000 in accordance with Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Morales, it overcompensated for its prior vague language by creating
guidelines that are too specific yet still unacceptably vague.128 Even
though the Revised Ordinance now applies only to gang members,
specifically defines loitering, and creates more precise guidelines for
issuing and complying with a dispersal order, the revisions have
brought about a new set of problems. The Revised Ordinance con-
tains a provision that allows the superintendent of police to designate
certain areas of the city-neighborhoods determined to have gang-
loitering problems-in which the Ordinance will be enforced.129 Fur-
thermore, even though the terms contain more narrow definitions,
they are still too vague and open to varying interpretations to be con-
stitutionally sound. 30
125. Id.
126. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999) (plurality opinion).
127. Strosnider, supra note 60, at 120-21 (footnote omitted).
128: See id. at 135-38.
129. Id. at 136.
130. Id. at 137.
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1. Discretion Allows Geographical and Racial Discrimination
The first problematic aspect of the Revised Ordinance is the provi-
sion transferring discretion from beat officers to the superintendent of
police. Originally, the beat police officers could make ad hoc deci-
sions as to who should be arrested; now, the superintendent of police
has the discretion to designate certain areas as enforcement "hot
spots," thereby choosing what area and what group of people the Re-
vised Ordinance will be enforced against.13' This shift in discretion
from one official to another does nothing to alleviate the unconstitu-
tionality of the Original Ordinance. In fact, whereas the beat officer
in cases such as Morales would make his own determination regarding
whom to arrest, the Revised Ordinance currently allows the superin-
tendent to effectively condemn an entire neighborhood and subject it
to the enforcement of the Ordinance. 132 While the discrimination in
the first instance was happening on a person-by-person basis, the revi-
sion allows entire groups of people to be discriminated against and
targeted simply because of the neighborhood in which they live.
The hot spots effectively create zones where the Ordinance is en-
forced-mostly concentrated in the poor and heavily minority-popu-
lated areas in the city.1 33 Additionally, the hot spots are not made
public; "the Chicago Police Department has insisted on keeping them
secret so it can keep targets of the ordinance guessing."134 Statistics
do show that a relatively small group of neighborhoods yields almost
all of the violence in the city and that most offenders are "African
American men who live in neighborhoods on the West or South sides
of the city,"' 3 5 but these statistics should not allow police to create
laws that are only applicable to those targeted areas. Allowing police
to apply laws exclusively to certain parts of the city is unjust and dis-
criminatory because it allows for enforcement largely based on racial
classifications and socioeconomic factors. Furthermore, the superin-
tendent need not disclose the selected areas to the public. The private
nature of the Ordinance's application does not even give people in hot
spots a chance to change their behavior so as not to be its target. In
several other cases, the Supreme Court invalidated ordinances that
were "used as vehicles for state racism or [were] enforced primarily
131. See id. at 136.
132. See id. at 137.
133. Strosnider, supra note 60, at 138.
134. Id. at 136.
135. MEARES ET AL., supra note 92, at 1 ("The 'city's' crime problem is in fact geographically
and socially concentrated in a few highly impoverished and socially isolated neighborhoods.").
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against minorities." 13 6 This is precisely what is happening here. The
police superintendent is able to target select communities composed
predominantly of minorities and enforce a law that is not in force in
many other parts of the city. At a minimum, the Ordinance should be
applied in every police district to avoid such overt discrimination.
The Revised Ordinance still allows for discrimination and discre-
tionary enforcement. The data indicates that Black and Hispanic peo-
ple who are under the age of thirty and live in a few areas in the south
and west sides of Chicago make up the vast majority of those who
have ever received a dispersal order. The superintendent used his dis-
cretionary ability to designate the hot spots in selecting the enforce-
ment locations resulting in particular groups being the main target of
the Ordinance. The effect of this discretionary choice is that, for a
number of reasons, police target only a small group of people.
2. Dispersal Orders Are Not Used to Reduce Gang Activity
a. Reduction in the Number of Orders Issued
In the three years the Original Ordinance was in effect prior to
Morales, "the police issued over 89,000 dispersal orders and arrested
over 42,000 people for violating the ordinance."137 The data shows
that between January 2000 and October 2010, less than 3,000 orders
had been issued. The reason for the drop in orders issued is unclear;
however, it seems clear that, for one reason or another, the Revised
Ordinance has fallen into disfavor. One possible explanation for the
decline in its use is that Chicago has employed another tactic in its
place, taking a cue from Justice O'Connor's Morales opinion.'38 An-
other explanation is that officials simply found the Revised Ordinance
to be ineffective.
b. Hollow Political Gesture
When the Revised Ordinance was enacted, its impact on gang loi-
tering and crime prevention was difficult to predict.139 Research at
the time showed that prosecutors did not use the statute; they pre-
ferred to charge the individuals with traditional crimes that were eas-
ier to prove.140 Enacting gang-related ordinances seemed to be a
136. Strosnider, supra note 60, at 122 (discussing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456
(1996), Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), Coates v. City of Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611 (1971), and Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965)).
137. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 49 (1999) (plurality opinion).
138. Id. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139. See Strosnider, supra note 60, at 108.
140. Id.
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political reaction to public outcry and was mainly used by politi-
cians-not police-to send a message to the community.141 For in-
stance, the police did not solicit the Original Ordinance; Mayor Daley
was the main driving force behind the Original Ordinance. 142 It seems
likely, given the testimony during the hearings in 1992, that Daley in-
sisted that the Original Ordinance be enacted in response to commu-
nity demand. In the years that followed, the numbers illustrate that
the Original Ordinance was an ineffective method of gang prevention.
Even with its revisions, the Revised Ordinance is still ineffective.14 3 It
is merely an empty symbol aimed at proving to Chicagoans that the
police are working to control gang violence, however futilely. 144
Compare the relatively low number of dispersal orders issued in the
last ten years with the high rates of gang violence and there is no obvi-
ous correlation. The purpose of both ordinances was to decrease gang
violence and gang presence in the streets, yet as far as the data availa-
ble at the time of this Comment shows, gang violence has not de-
creased with an increase in dispersal orders.
3. Revised Ordinance Does Not Remedy the Original Ordinance's
Flaws
In addition to the arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement the Re-
vised Ordinance allows, the meaning of the Revised Ordinance's more
specific language and accompanying definitions are also vague and
subject to interpretation. 14 5 Where phrases in the Original Ordinance
such as "with no apparent purpose" were troubling to the Supreme
Court, now phrases like "establish control" should be found equally
troubling.
Accordingly, it may be impossible to craft a valid anti-gang loitering
statute. While the first version was vague and allowed for overbroad
141. Id.
142. Id. at 112.
143. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
144. Cf Fran Spielman, Chicago Council OKs Earlier Curfew for Kids Under 12, CHI. SUN-
TIMES (July 29, 2011, 2:15 AM), http://www.suntimes.com/news/cityhall/6751881-418/chicago-
council-oks-earlier-curfew-for-kids-under-12.html (describing Chicago's new curfew for children
under the age of 12). Fraternal Order of Police President Mike Shields called the curfew a sad
commentary on "the society we live in" and stated "that after a two-year hiring slowdown that
has created a severe manpower shortage, the latest curfew crackdown is more symbolic than
real." Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). "It's not going to be enforcible.
If we can't enforce laws to curb street violence because of manpower issues, how can we enforce
[an even stricter] curfew law?" Id.
145. Strosnider, supra note 60, at 137 ("[I]t is unclear what the city intended when it wrote of
'establish[ing] control over identifiable areas' and 'intimidat[ing] others from entering those ar-
eas.' What constitutes an 'identifiable area'?" (second and third alterations in original) (quoting
CHI., ILL., CODE § 8-4-015(a) (2000)).
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police discretion-and was thus unconstitutional-the second version
is almost as vaguely worded, in that it transfers police discretion from
the beat officers to their superiors and is only applicable in certain
selected areas.146 The ability to select areas in which to enforce the
Revised Ordinance illustrates the legislature's ability "to enact provi-
sions that apply only to minority groups or segments thereof without
facing the political accountability attending the passage of a generally
applicable statute." 147 This element is not an improvement on the old
statute "in that it enables-even codifies-a more systematic targeting
of the poor and racial minorities through the selection of enforcement
hot spots by Chicago police. To date those hot spots have been con-
centrated on the city's poor and heavily minority South and West
sides."1 48 The targeted nature of the Revised Ordinance "implicates
both due process and equal protection, the two doctrines intertwined
in Morales. In this new Chicago ordinance, the dilemma of crafting a
constitutional anti-gang ordinance becomes starkly apparent." 149
C. Community-Based Programs, a Possible Solution to
Chicago's Gang Problem
The intent behind the adoption of the Revised Ordinance was clear
from the outset: to make neighborhoods safer and remove gang pres-
ence in the streets.150 However, it has had a negligible, if any, effect
on gang-related crime rates. The Revised Ordinance is nothing more
than a symbolic tool used by legislatures to convince the public that
methods are being implemented to solve Chicago's gang problem.
The city should undertake a concerted, grassroots effort to provide
social programs and education to the city's gang-involved youth in-
stead of using targeted suppressive techniques. These tactics would
attack the underlying root of the problem instead of suppressing the
146. Id. at 137.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 137-38.
149. Id. at 138.
On the one hand, vagueness doctrine's evolving arbitrary-enforcement requirement, as
articulated by the Court in Kolender and now Morales, demands a specific, clearly
targeted ordinance that is not susceptible to discriminatory enforcement by police. On
the other hand, laws that are too specific-isolating enforcement only in particular hot
spots and against particular groups-runs afoul of a fundamental tenet of due process:
that the law is to be general in application. Further, laws that are specific to gangs are
bound to have unequal effects on minority communities, given the heavy Hispanic and
African-American representation in street gangs as shown by researchers and govern-
ment surveys.
Id. (footnote omitted).
150. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 47 (1999) (plurality opinion).
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problem once it has manifested (when it is too late). Although some
of Chicago's social programs-such as CAPS and PSN-are geared
toward bolstering community involvement in gang-crime prevention,
they are insufficient and are still focused on police enforcement. In
other words, these programs join community efforts with law enforce-
ment efforts. They are not like the purely social, educational, and vo-
cational programs utilized in cities like New York City. 151
Chicago's adoption of CAPS in 1993, one year after the enactment
of the Original Ordinance, appeared to be the perfect grassroots solu-
tion to gang presence in the community, perhaps even similar to the
New York systems that were so successful at curbing gang violence. 152
However, the 2004 report demonstrates that CAPS ultimately fell
short in police and community involvement, as well as problem solv-
ing.153 Other programs yielded mixed results as to their effectiveness.
Through a program currently in place and successful in New York
City, the Gang Prevention and Intervention Unit (GPIU), the Depart-
ment of Education is getting involved in gang prevention by reaching
out to school administrators. 154 GPIU's mission "is to support the ed-
ucation of students in New York City public schools by providing high
quality professional development, technical assistance, and collabora-
tive intervention related to gang presence and gang activity within
schools."155 This program targets youth before they begin experi-
menting with gang activity-the precise time that these children des-
perately need support to stay out of gangs. Chicago cannot stage
meetings with established gang leaders and expect change; it must
seek out the youth that will, without any anti-gang program interven-
tion, end up in a gang.
Community-based, non-police-involved programs have proven to
be the most effective intervention and prevention techniques in New
York City, and they would be equally effective in Chicago. As in New
York City, Chicago youth in gang-prone neighborhoods are pro-
foundly wary of police and do not fully trust police-affiliated pro-
grams. Communities prone to gang violence are sometimes less
151. See Edwards & Steele, supra note 3 ("A fear of police, . . . 'street justice mentality' and
an absolute refusal to work with the system, crippled [Chicago's gang-suppression] efforts.").
"[U]nless people want to become victims themselves, Weis said, the only [way] to get criminals
out of communities is to cooperate with law enforcement. But navigating the fuzzy line between
aggressive, proactive policing and professionalism is difficult." Id.
152. See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
153. See SKOGAN & STEINER, supra note 85, at 154-55.
154. See Gang Prevention and Intervention, N.Y.C. DEP'T EDUC., http://schools.nyc.gov/Stu-
dentSupport/NonAcademicSupport/GangPrevention/default.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
155. Id.
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inclined to develop partnerships with police, so it is important that
there be independent programs as well.156 In addition to their skepti-
cism of police programs, the "no-snitch" code makes it very difficult
for police to gain cooperation from residents in neighborhoods with
gang problems.1'5 In 2010, Cook County State's Attorney Anita Al-
varez said that "[t]he distrust of law enforcement is out there in many
communities .... We have seen the effects of Burge . ... They don't
trust the system. They don't trust the police. And as a result, you
have less people willing to cooperate." 5 8 This distrust is a main ob-
stacle in front of a successful gang-violence reduction strategy and it
further emphasizes the need for community-based, non-police
programs.
D. Successful Community-Driven Programs in Chicago
If funding were funneled into creating more programs such as these,
wheels would be set in motion to finally make a real attempt at stop-
ping gang activity. The following instances of small, non-police-
affiliated groups making a difference prove that programs can work.
In Roseland (one of the most dangerous Chicago neighborhoods), a
grandmother has been inviting kids into her home since 2003 in an
effort to keep them away from gangs.159 Her nonprofit community
program, entitled the "Kids Off the Block" Youth Community Center,
has reached more than 1,500 would-be gang members.160 The pro-
gram's founder, Diane Latiker, has kept her home-and now an adja-
cent center-open twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.161 She
provides job interview training, sporting activities, field trips, and
tutoring sessions with teachers or retired educators.162 She has said,
"It doesn't matter where [the kids] come from, what they've done ....
We've had six gangs in my living room at one time. . . . But that was
the safe place. And you know what? They respected that."163 The
program is primarily aimed at males aged 11-24 (the age group most
commonly issued dispersal orders), and many young boys credit it for
156. Gang Prevention, supra note 101.
157. See Konkol & Main, supra note 6. The "no-snitch" code refers to witness reluctance to
aid police or prosecution in identifying criminals. See id.
158. Id.
159. Allie Torgan, Grandmother Helping Chicago Kids 'Off the Block,' CNN (Apr. 7, 2011,
7:39 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/LIVING/04/07/cnnheroes.latiker.roseland.youth; see also
Chicago Memorial Represents 'A Generation Dying,' CNN (Apr. 8, 2011, 3:24 PM), http://www.
cnn.com/2011/LIVING/04/08/cnnheroes.latiker.extra.
160. Torgan, supra note 159.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (third alteration in original).
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saving their lives and keeping them out of jail and off the streets. 164
Latiker says, "Our young people need help .... All of them are not
gang-bangers. All of them are not dropouts. But the ones that are,
they need our help. Somehow or another, something ain't right here.
And why don't we ask them about it?"165 This program is effectively
helping the main demographic targeted by the Revised Ordinance (as
the data above seems to indicate) when the dispersal orders and po-
lice-involved programs have failed them.
Similarly, a Chicago couple that was constantly threatened by gangs
with violence and destruction of their home, instead of choosing to
relocate, started two after-school basketball programs, one called Be-
yond the Ball and the other called Bitty Ball,1 66 to provide neighbor-
hood kids "a place to play and a chance to stay out of gangs." 167 To
date, thousands of kids have participated in the program. "Some of
the players were gang members-even from rival gangs. But inside
the gym there were rules: No fighting. No gang-banging. No
trouble."168 In that same neighborhood, the Little Village Youth Fo-
rum, a community program aimed at teaching teens how to avoid
street violence, has inspired kids and parents to work to prevent vio-
lence and empower youth.169 "The solution is not only to assign more
police to the most violent areas in the city. There also has to be more
emphasis on a comprehensive approach that includes police, neigh-
borhood organizations, schools, parents, business and programs such
as the Little Village Youth Forum."' 70 A police officer started his own
community program "focus[ing] on working with kids rather than su-
pervising or policing them."171 He teaches them life skills and realizes
that what the kids want is more youth-based activities and more face
time.172
These programs are not officially affiliated with police; they are sim-
ply instances of people trying to improve their neighborhoods, target-
ing their efforts to keep children out of gangs instead of arresting
them. These examples illustrate the fact that Chicago's youth living in
gang-prone neighborhoods do not feel comfortable sharing informa-
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. BEYOND THE BALL, http://www.beyondtheball.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2012).
167. Mark Konkol, Standing Tall in Little Village, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 3, 2011, at A12.
168. Id.
169. Alejandro Escalona, Little Village Forum to Keep Kids out of Gangs Should Expand,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, at 25.
170. Id.
171. See Edwards & Steele, supra note 3.
172. Id.
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tion with the police, 73 which is why new prevention and intervention
tactics must be separate from the police in order to be successful. Po-
lice tactics contribute to the continued gang-violence problem as much
as the illusory and symbolic ordinances they carry out.
The Revised Ordinance, as the data for the last ten years indicates,
is not used frequently and has not had any meaningful effect on reduc-
ing gang violence. It is just one example of a law designed to carry out
the legitimate goal of gang-crime prevention that in fact engenders
discrimination and does not accomplish its goal. Chicago is a city
plagued with gang violence, and it should use another method to elim-
inate gang crime: community programs that have no ties to Chicago
police and are designed to empower youth-prevention and interven-
tion rather than suppression. The success of the strategies imple-
mented in New York City demonstrates that investing in
neighborhood organizations in areas with significant gang problems
can significantly reduce gang activity. Chicago should analyze how
exactly New York City has managed to nearly eliminate gang violence
and implement the most effective methods. The organizations and
programs should likewise focus on providing recreational programs,
community-organized events, job opportunities, and mediation ses-
sions for young gang members. Like New York City, Chicago should
dedicate resources primarily, to community programs that are unre-
lated to police units in order to provide youths with tools to avoid
gang membership all together.
IV. CONCLUSION
Chicago has a serious problem on its hands. Gang violence and
crime is a daily occurrence and has been for years. The Revised Ordi-
nance is but one example of the illusory and ineffective tactics that
Chicago has used in attempting to address its gang problem. Chi-
cago's approach has largely been suppressive, and the city has tried to
combat the problem by making arrests at a beat level. Data compiled
after the Morales decision strongly suggests that the Revised Ordi-
nance has fallen into disuse, and even when it is applied, it is still used
with the same discriminatory and discretionary effect as its unconstitu-
tional predecessor.
If Chicago wants to turn its gang-war failure into a success story, it
must funnel resources into social programs that get to the heart of the
gang issue by preventing potential gang members from joining and by
giving existing members an exit strategy. The programs should be run
173. Id.
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by independent entities not associated with the police and provide
outlets to children before they enter gangs. Educational and commu-
nity programs will provide alternatives to gang activity in gang-prone
neighborhoods and reduce Chicago's gang problem; ineffective and
misapplied ordinances will not.
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